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SECURITIES LITIGATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT: THE CANADIAN 
PERSPECTIVE 
Poonam Puri∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Achieving the proper balance between public and private securities en-
forcement is critical for promoting investor confidence and robust capital 
markets. There has been extensive research to determine whether public 
or private enforcement provides more effective market discipline and 
investor protection. These studies generally approach the question in 
terms of efficiency, accountability, ability to provide comprehensive 
market discipline, deterrence, and the best interests of the public. As a 
result, the traditional debate pits public and private enforcement against 
each other in an attempt to suggest that one offers an all-around superior 
approach.1 This Article suggests that public and private enforcement 
each serve important and complimentary roles in protecting the interests 
of the investing public. Thus, it cannot be said that one is necessarily 
more important or capable than the other, rather that they should be un-
derstood as part of a unitary regime. 
Although a comparative approach is used, the primary focus of this ar-
ticle is how recent legislative changes and market events have influenced 
the Canadian securities landscape. In doing so, this Article contributes to 
the ongoing debate on public and private enforcement by evaluating se-
curities enforcement from a systemic perspective, focusing on the rela-
tionship between public and private enforcement and synergies that exist 
in the Canadian environment. This analysis of recent trends and literature 
on securities enforcement in Canada highlights the interrelationship be-
tween public and private enforcement in Canada and supports the con-
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 1. See Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection: Origins, Consequences, Reform 5–
6 (World Bank Fin. Sector, Discussion Paper No. 1, 1999), available at 
http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/assets/images/Fs01_web1.pdf; Howell E. Jackson & 
Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evi-
dence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 207–08 (2009). 
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clusion that any legislative changes must consider the securities regula-
tory framework as a whole as opposed to affecting changes on a piece-
meal basis. 
Part I of this Article begins with an overview of Canadian capital mar-
kets in comparison to those in the United States. This Part highlights the 
disproportionately high number of reporting issuers in Canada given the 
size of Canadian capital markets, the difficulties inherent in Canada’s 
provincially regulated securities environment, and the traditionally more 
conservative behavior of Canadian regulators in respect of enforcement. 
Part II discusses public enforcement in Canada and the traditional criti-
cism that Canadian regulators are less aggressive than their American 
counterparts. However, examination of this claim suggests that these dis-
tinctions are primarily due to Canada’s differing philosophical approach 
to securities regulation relative to the United States, rather than a reduced 
capacity. Also considered in Part II are three recent developments in Ca-
nadian securities regulation. First, there is the introduction of no-contest 
settlements in Ontario. Unlike securities regulators in the United States, 
Canadian regulators historically do not allow no-contest settlements. 
However, in late 2011, the Ontario Securities Commission (“OSC”) be-
gan public consultations to allow this form of settlement.2 Second, is the 
public regulators’ initiative to provide compensation to investors. The 
OSC decided to provide investors with the proceeds from large public 
settlements following the asset-backed commercial paper (“ABCP”) cri-
sis in 20073 as well as settlements from the 1999–2003 Canadian mutual 
funds market timing scandal.4 Although these changes are positive de-
velopments for Canadian securities regulation and provide a dynamic 
balance between public and private enforcement, regulators should estab-
lish clear policies to ensure that investors’ expectations are protected. 
This Part of the Article concludes with a discussion of Canada’s effort to 
introduce a national securities regulator and the options available follow-
                                                                                                         
 2. OSC Staff Notice 15-704 Request For Comments on Proposed Enforcement Ini-
tiatives, 34 O.S.C. BULL. 10720, 10720–26 (2011) [hereinafter OSC Staff Notice 15-704], 
available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-
OSCB/oscb_20111021_3442.pdf. 
 3. Notice of Application, In re Ont. Sec. Comm’n & Inv. Indus. Regulatory Ass’n of 
Can. & In re Declaration Concerning the Interpretation of the Order of June 5, 2008 by 
the Honourable C. Campbell J. Approving the Plan of Compromise and Arrangement 
Involving Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments Corp et al., Toronto CV 12-
9606-OOCL (Ont. Sup. Ct., Feb. 15, 2012) (Can.), available at 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/News/nr_20120216_osc-irroc-notice-
application.pdf. 
 4. Settlement Agreement, In re Sec. Act R.S.O. 1990, c.S.5, as amended & AGF 
Funds Inc., OSC PROC. (Dec. 12, 2004). 
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ing a recent decision by the Supreme Court of Canada that the federal 
government lacks jurisdiction to establish a national securities regulator. 
Finally, Part III reviews the development of private enforcement in 
Canada. Unlike private enforcement in the United States, Canada’s pri-
vate enforcement regime is a relatively recent development. Class action 
legislation was introduced in 1993 and secondary market statutory liabil-
ity came into force in 2005.5 Another factor distinguishing Canada from 
the United States is the Canadian cap on secondary market statutory li-
ability. Canada’s private enforcement regime is less developed than the 
United States. The reduced amount of litigation in Canada is partially 
attributable to the balance between public regulation and private en-
forcement, as demonstrated by the court’s sanctioned release from pri-
vate liability in the ABCP crisis in 2007.6 Part III concludes with a re-
view of Canada’s class action regime and the growing number of global 
class actions certified in Canada. Although Canada’s private enforcement 
regime is less litigious than the U.S. regime, this appears to be changing 
now that Canadian securities legislation makes it easier for plaintiffs to 
bring private actions and the securities class action bar is becoming more 
developed. 
I. CANADIAN CONTEXT 
Canadian capital markets are closely integrated with the United States 
and have generally followed its lead on major legislative reforms. This 
Part provides a brief context on the structure of and development of Ca-
nadian capital markets, reviews the tendency for Canadian regulators to 
follow the lead of the United States, and finally, introduces challenges 
that exist in Canada’s provincially regulated securities environment. 
 
A. The Nature of Canadian Capital Markets 
First, Canadian capital markets are relatively small in relation to inter-
national equity markets. As of 2004, the size of Canadian markets was 
approximately CAD $1.178 trillion, comprising about 3.2% of world-
wide market capitalization.7 In stark comparison, the combined market 
                                                                                                         
 5. Class Proceedings Act, S.O. 1992, c. 6 (Can.); Ont. Bill 198, An Act to imple-
ment Budget measures and other initiatives of the Government, 4th Sess., 37th Parl., § 
185 (2005) (Can.). 
 6. Pan-Canadian Investors Comm. for Third-Party Structured Asset-Backed Com-
mercial Paper v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., 2008 CanLII 
23497 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) [hereinafter Metcalfe & Mansfield]. 
 7. Christopher Nicholls, The Characteristics of Canada’s Capital Markets and the 
Illustrative Case of Canada’s Legislative Regulatory Response to Sarbanes-Oxley, in 4 
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capitalization of the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), the American 
Stock Exchange, and the NASDAQ Stock Market was approximately 
43.9%.8 While Canada’s total market capitalization is not very large, it 
hosts a disproportionately large number of public companies, meaning 
there are a high number of smaller companies. In 2004, there were ap-
proximately 3,500–4,000 public companies;9 a large number when com-
pared to the 9,400 public companies in the United States at that time.10 In 
fact, at this time, Canada appeared to have more public companies per 
capita.11 Another important feature of the Canadian public company 
landscape is that it has a relatively small number of very large issuers. 
For example, the 100 largest companies on the Toronto Stock Exchange 
(“TSX”) account for over 70% of the market capitalization of all TSX-
listed companies.12 By contrast, the 1,000 smallest issuers on the TSX 
account for less than 5% of its total market capitalization.13 There is a 
disparity between the United States and Canada’s perspectives as to what 
characteristics define a “small” or “large” company, with Canada’s small 
issuers being significantly smaller than those in the United States.14 This 
results in a bifurcation in Canada’s issuer base, which might suggest that 
Canada needs, in some instances, different policies and enforcement 
strategies to accommodate for the unique range of issuers.15 Also, this 
data suggests that some Canadian public companies go public too early, 
that the venture capital market is underdeveloped, and that there are op-
portunities for consolidation.16 
Another important feature of Canada’s capital market landscape is that 
many of the largest issuers, representing over 50% of the TSX’s market 
capitalization, are cross-listed on American exchanges.17 Data shows that 
                                                                                                         
CANADA STEPS UP 129, 149 (June 15, 2006), available at 
http://www.tfmsl.ca/docs/V4%283A%29%20Nicholls.pdf. 
 8. Id. at 149. 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. at 153. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. at 154. 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. at 162. 
 15. See generally id. (suggesting that the “lighter” regulations set up for small-cap 
companies in the U.S. could still  “prove overly burdensome” for the even smaller small-
cap companies in Canada). 
 16. See id. at 157. Nicholls suggests that this information is at least evident of the fact 
that less consolidation of firms occurs in Canada than in the United States and that com-
panies in Canada are going public at an earlier stage—from 1995–2005, over half of the 
companies that made initial public offerings in Canada had market caps of less than $100 
million and less than 5% had market caps of over $500 million. 
 17. Id. at 158. 
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eighty-six issuers on the TSX were also listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange (“NYSE”), with fifty-one of the largest issuers falling into this 
category.18 NASDAQ’s exchanges feature fifty-one TSX-listed issuers.19 
Practically speaking, cross-listed companies are subject to the rules and 
regulations of both Canada and the United States, with possible enforce-
ment oversight by both the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) and Canadian securities regulators.20 This “double oversight” 
causes concerns about the potential confusion in accountability between 
Canadian and U.S. regulators and duplication of regulatory actions, and 
raises the broader question of whether both jurisdictions should be in-
volved in enforcement activities. Indeed, some suggest that Canada 
should maintain its focus on Canadian-only companies and leave the 
oversight of enforcement activities for cross-listed issuers to the SEC.21 
If this suggestion were followed however, many of the larger issuers in 
Canada would be excluded from Canadian oversight, even though a sig-
nificant number of their investors would likely be Canadian. From a pol-
icy perspective, the independence and autonomy of Canadian regulators 
would also be greatly undermined. 
The Canadian exchanges are often associated with various categories 
of listed public companies including the natural resource industry. In 
2004, Canadian exchanges were most active in mining, oil and gas, 
manufacturing, technology, and financial services.22 Today, the TMX 
Group, which is the umbrella organization for the TSX and the Toronto 
Stock Venture Exchange, notes that these two exchanges list the highest 
number of oil and gas companies than any other exchange in the world.23 
An important feature of the Canadian corporate governance landscape 
is that Canadian public companies are allowed to maintain a dual-class 
share structure. This structure enables companies to issue multiple 
classes of shares with differential voting rights attached to the shares and 
                                                                                                         
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. ONT. SEC. COMM’N [O.S.C.], NATIONAL INSTRUMENT 71-101 TRANSACTIONS 
OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION (1999). 
 21. Warren Grover, Q.C., Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP, Falconbridge Lecture in 
Commercial Law at Osgoode Hall Law School: Corporate Governance of Greed 18 (Oct. 
7, 2004), transcript available at 
http://osgoode.yorku.ca/media2.nsf/events/612468A480B1787885256F2C006DEAAB. 
 22. Nicholls, supra note 7, at 164. 
 23. See Energy, Oil & Gas, TMXMONEY, 
http://www.tmxmoney.com/en/sector_profiles/energy.html (last updated Feb. 24, 2012). 
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often rests significant control in the hands of few people.24 In these situa-
tions, minority (by votes) shareholders may be less able to exercise influ-
ence, and thus, shareholder approval may not always be demonstrative of 
appropriate governance practices.25 Dual-class share structures are more 
common in Canada than in the United States.26 Any discussion of corpo-
rate governance must proceed with the understanding that the challenge 
is not only to ensure that professional managers act in the best interests 
of the organization, its shareholders, and stakeholders, but also to im-
plement practices that minimize the ability of controlling shareholders to 
extract private benefits for their advantage and to the detriment of public 
shareholders.27 
B. Geographic and Other Proximities to the United States 
The United States has an undeniable influence on Canadian capital 
markets and securities regulation. While the Canadian and U.S. regimes 
are quite different, there is no doubt that geographical proximity and cul-
tural, political, economic, and legal developments in the United States 
impact Canadian practices. First and most obviously, the geographic 
proximity of the United States and the size of its markets make American 
legislation relevant to Canadian companies that are cross-listed on U.S. 
exchanges and to companies that plan to be in the future.28 Second, the 
proximity and resulting similarities in terms of cultural, political, and 
economic norms have created interdependencies between the two juris-
dictions with regard to trading and many other facets of business. While 
Canadian autonomy will always be a concern, the reality in the securities 
industry is that the relative sizes of the Canadian and U.S. markets alone 
will significantly influence how autonomous Canada can truly be.29 
                                                                                                         
 24. Anita Anand, Frank Milne & Lynnette Purda, Voluntary Adoption of Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms 13 (Queen’s Univ. Econs. Dept., Working Paper No. 1112, 
2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=921450. 
 25. Anita Anand, Towards Effective Balance Between Investors and Issuers in Secu-
rities Regulation, in 3 CANADA STEPS UP 25 (Aug. 1, 2006), available at 
http://www.tfmsl.ca/docs/v3%281%29%20anand.pdf. 
 26. Houlihan Lokey, Dual Class Stock Structures, AM. BAR ASSOC. 1 (Aug. 2011), 
http://www2.americanbar.org/calendar/2011-aba-annual-meeting-business-
law/Meeting%20Materials/1986.pdf. Companies are not allowed to adopt dual-class 
structures once they have been registered on the NYSE. Id. 
 27. Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Poonam Puri, Dual Class Shares in Canada: An Historical 
Analysis, 29 DALHOUSIE L.J. 117, 126–32 (2006). 
 28. Anand, supra note 25, at 42. 
 29. See Nicholls, supra note 7, at 149 (Canada has approximately 3.2% of worldwide 
market capitalization). 
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An example of the convergence to U.S. policies and practices is Can-
ada’s adoption of new, stricter corporate governance rules following the 
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”).30 In response to 
the various corporate scandals making their way through North America, 
the United States enacted the SOX legislation to tighten up their corpo-
rate governance rules and address issues such as accounting fraud and 
top-level mismanagement.31 Following this development, Canada faced 
pressure to adopt similar changes and in 2004 implemented National In-
strument 58-101,32 National Policy 58-201,33 and National Instrument 
52-110,34 all of which addressed the need for stricter corporate govern-
ance guidelines.35 Regardless of whether this new legislation in the 
United States was adopted by Canadian regulators, many Canadian com-
panies were forced to comply with the SOX requirements given the high 
proportion of companies cross-listed on U.S. exchanges. From this per-
spective, U.S. rules and legislation became just as relevant as Canadian 
laws.36 Additionally, Canadian corporate governance policy may con-
verge with U.S. rules and regulations even when they are only listed in 
Canada because of global competition. Specifically, Canadian companies 
may feel pressure to adopt U.S. guidelines to match what many of their 
competitors have already done.37 
                                                                                                         
 30. See generally Tara Gray, Econ. Div., Canadian Response to the U.S. Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002: New Directions for Corporate Governance, PRB 05–37E  (2005) 
(Can.). 
 31. Erinn B. Broshko & Kai Li, Corporate Governance Requirements in Canada and 
the United States: A Legal Empirical Comparison of the Principles-Based and Rules-
Based Approaches 1 (Sauder Sch. of Bus. Working Paper, 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=892708##; see also Poonam Puri & 
Anindya Sen, A Cost Benefit Analysis of the Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System, 
OSGOOD HALL L. SCH. 19–20 (June 10, 2003), 
http://osgoode.yorku.ca/osgmedia.nsf/0/1D216EBEABA2FCFA852571CC00596068/$FI
LE/Cost_Benefit_MJDS.pdf. 
 32. O.S.C., NATIONAL INSTRUMENT 58-201 DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
PRACTICES  (2008). 
 33. O.S.C., NATIONAL INSTRUMENT 58-201 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES 
(2005), available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-
Category5/rule_20050617_58-201_corp-gov-guidelines.pdf. 
 34. O.S.C., MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT 52-110 AUDIT COMMITTEES (2011). 
 35. Broshko & Li, supra note 31, at 1; see also POONAM PURI, CAPITAL MARKETS 
INSTITUTE, ENFORCEMENT EFFECTIVENESS IN CANADIAN CAPITAL MARKETS 6–7 (Dec. 1, 
2005) [hereinafter PURI, ENFORCEMENT EFFECTIVENESS], available at 
http://www.investorvoice.ca/Research/Puri_Enforcement_Effectiveness_01Dec05.pdf. 
 36. Anand, supra note 25, at 44. 
 37. Id. 
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Most importantly, the proximity and similarity to the larger, and ar-
guably more sophisticated, U.S. market has prompted criticism of Can-
ada’s comparatively lax securities enforcement efforts.38 While there are 
many factors to consider when evaluating the comparative effectiveness 
of the two regimes, including the types of remedies available to regula-
tors and the timing of the development of each regime, many assert the 
relative effectiveness of the U.S. regime over the Canadian one.39 One 
reason for this perception that the United States is a more effective en-
forcer is the SEC’s aggressive pursuit of high-profile cases. The Hollin-
ger scandal provides a good example. Conrad Black was removed as the 
Chairman of Hollinger in January 2004 and was aggressively investi-
gated by the SEC thereafter, resulting in a civil fraud lawsuit in Novem-
ber of that year.40 It was not until March of 2005 that the OSC launched 
proceedings against Black and Hollinger Inc.41 In 2004, after mounting 
pressure in the face of the SEC’s swift pursuit, the OSC was forced to 
depart from standard practice and announced that an investigation into 
the activities surrounding the alleged fraud was, in fact, under way.42 
Addressing the difference between the OSC and SEC pursuit of the mat-
ter, former Premier of Ontario Bob Rae stated, “For me, the hardest part 
about the Conrad Black trial has been explaining why it happened in 
Chicago and not Toronto.”43 
As mentioned above, the convergence toward U.S. policies is a dis-
cernable trend, and will be further discussed below in the context of a 
                                                                                                         
 38. See, e.g., Peder de Carteret Cory & Marilyn L. Pilkington, Critical Issues in En-
forcement, in 6 CANADA STEPS UP 167, 196–97 (Sept. 2006), available at 
http://www.investorvoice.ca/Research/CanadaStepsUp_Critical_Issues_Sept06.pdf; PURI, 
ENFORCEMENT EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 35, at 4. 
 39. A more in depth discussion takes place in the following section on Public En-
forcement in Canada. See infra Part II. 
 40. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm. [S.E.C.], SEC Files Fraud Charges 
against Conrad Black, F. David Radler and Hollinger Inc. (Nov. 15, 2004) [hereinafter 
SEC Press Release], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-155.htm; see also 
OSC Launches Proceedings Against Black, Hollinger Inc., CBC NEWS (Mar. 18, 2005, 
8:56 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2005/03/18/oscblack-050318.html [here-
inafter CBC NEWS]. 
 41. Statement of Allegations of Staff of the O.S.C. at 1, In re Sec. Act R.S.O. 1990, c. 
S.5, & Hollinger Inc., OSC PROC. (Mar. 18, 2005) (Can.) [hereinafter Hollinger], avail-
able at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Proceedings-SOA/soa_20050318-
_hollinger-inc.pdf. 
 42. OSC Says Hollinger Investigation Underway, OTTAWA BUS. J. (Jan. 22, 2004), 
http://www.obj.ca/Other/Archives/2004-01-22/article-2129056/OSC-says-Hollinger-
investigation-underway/1. 
 43. Tyler Hamilton, Why the OSC so rarely gets its man, TORONTO STAR (Dec. 1, 
2007), http://www.thestar.com/printArticle/281645. 
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very recent proposal by the OSC, which, if implemented, will have a 
considerable impact on the ease and frequency with which settlements 
can be reached in Canada. 
C. Provincial and Territorial System of Securities Regulation 
As alluded to earlier, the structures of the Canadian and U.S. regula-
tory regimes are quite different. To start, while the United States has one 
national regulator governing the activities of capital markets and state 
regulators addressing local needs, Canada employs regulators only at the 
provincial and territorial level.44 As a result, the securities regulation 
landscape is divided into thirteen jurisdictions. Many commentators have 
suggested that the current regulatory structure in Canada may increase 
noncompliance and impose unnecessary costs on investors and market 
participants. The number of regulators combined with criminal enforce-
ment efforts and self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”) increases the 
need for coordination and cooperation, and may cause jurisdictional 
overlap and accountability issues.45 
Variations in remedies and underlying policies across regulators also 
raise the question of whether a more centralized body is needed to regu-
late Canada’s capital markets.46 Currently, the Canadian Securities Ad-
ministrators (“CSA”) undertakes coordination efforts across provinces 
and territories, and aligns policy goals across jurisdictions.47 The CSA is 
also tasked with releasing annual reports to communicate relevant infor-
mation regarding enforcement and sanctions to the public.48 
Securities experts in Canada have been deliberating over the transition 
to a national regulator for approximately forty years, with no success to 
date. 49 Various expert panels and task forces have been established to 
explore the issue and what such a shift would mean for the future of se-
curities regulation in Canada.50 Indeed, the move towards a national 
                                                                                                         
 44. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 92(13) (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 
1985, app. II, no. 5 (Can.). 
 45. PURI, ENFORCEMENT EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 35, at 9. 
 46. Id. at 21–22. 
 47. See generally CANADIAN SEC. ADM’RS, http://www.securities-
administrators.ca/aboutcsa.aspx?id=77 (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (the Canadian Securi-
ties Administrators are comprised of regulators from each province and territory in Can-
ada and are “primarily responsible for developing a harmonized approach to securities 
regulation across [Canada]”). 
 48. PURI, ENFORCEMENT EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 35, at 23. 
 49. Poonam Puri, Legal Origins, Investor Protection, and Canada, 2009 BYU L. 
REV. 1671, 1688 [hereinafter Puri, Legal Origins]. 
 50. For example, the Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation was established 
in 2005 in order to make recommendations for modernizing Canadian legislation to in-
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regulator may be seen as another choice by Canada to converge to the 
U.S. approach. Some would argue that Canada is closer than ever to 
making this proposition a reality. 
The latest attempt to establish a national regulator resulted in the crea-
tion of the Canadian Securities Transition Office as of June 2009, as per 
the report and recommendations of the Expert Panel on Securities Regu-
lation.51 Further, a proposed federal securities act was tabled in the 
House of Commons on May 26, 2010 and referred to the Supreme Court 
of Canada for a reference decision on whether the federal government 
had jurisdiction to introduce this legislation.52 The initiative has received 
pushback from some Canadian provinces, notably Quebec and Alberta, 
which have questioned the constitutionality of the proposed legislation, 
citing an infringement of the federal government on provincial powers.53 
Reference hearings took place in April 2011, and the Supreme Court 
rendered its decision in December 2011, holding that the federal gov-
ernment lacks the jurisdiction to unilaterally create a national securities 
regulator.54 Accordingly, a deeper look at the current structure of the Ca-
nadian capital market regime and some of the proposed changes to it are 
discussed in Part II below. 
D. Canada Comes Out of the Global Financial Crisis Unscathed, or 
Not? 
Amidst the economic turbulence that the world has experienced since 
2008, Canada is perceived to have a safe and stable regulatory system 
and a conservative banking industry.55 Indeed, the Washington Post 
writes that, “While the United States reels from the global financial cri-
sis, with credit markets still frozen and stock prices careening from highs 
                                                                                                         
crease Canada’s competitiveness and maintain investor protection. See Paul Halpern & 
Poonam Puri, “Canada Steps Up”—Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in 
Canada: Recommendations and Discussion, 2 CAPITAL MARKETS L.J. 191 (2007). 
 51. Puri, Legal Origins, supra note 49, at 1693; see CAN. SEC. TRANSITION OFF., 
http://csto.ca (last visited Apr. 9, 2012). 
 52. Reference re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66, ¶ 134 (Can.), available at 
http://scc.lexum.org/en/2011/2011scc66/2011scc66.pdf. 
 53. Nigel Campbell & Doug McLeod, Supreme Court Hears Arguments on National 
Securities Regulator, BLAKES BULL. (Apr. 20, 2011), 
http://www.blakes.com/english/view_bulletin.asp?ID=4714. 
 54. Re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66, ¶ 134 (Can.). 
 55. Caroline Hepker, G20: Why we all want to be Canadian now, BBC NEWS (June 
25, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10409354. 
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to lows, Canada has remained relatively insulated.”56 In 2010, the World 
Economic Forum touted Canada as having the soundest banking system 
in the world for the third consecutive year.57 On this achievement, Fi-
nance Minister Jim Flaherty commented that the stability of Canada’s 
financial sector “is the result of a sound regulatory regime, including 
capital requirements for financial institutions that are well above mini-
mum international standards and higher than in many other jurisdictions, 
and a more conservative risk appetite among financial institutions.”58 He 
also emphasized, however, that regulation is not enough to maintain a 
safe financial environment—effective supervision is also essential.59 The 
Canadian market is seen to be so stable that Mark Carney, Governor of 
the Bank of Canada, was appointed chairman of the Financial Stability 
Board on November 4, 2011, most likely due to “Canada’s global reputa-
tion for strong financial services regulation, and the strength of Canada’s 
banks.”60 
This perception that Canada’s stable regulatory environment allowed it 
to escape the catastrophic effects of the credit crisis serves as a direct 
contradiction to the criticism that Canada’s fragmented regulatory regime 
is inadequate for the challenges faced by financial markets. The fact re-
mains that Canada did face a crisis, albeit smaller in scale than the rest of 
the world. Following the subprime crisis in the United States, Canadian 
holders of commercial paper questioned the value of the assets behind 
their paper and, to protect themselves, discontinued investing in the 
ABCP market; the result being that conduits were not able to pay out 
maturing ABCP.61 
                                                                                                         
 56. Keith B. Richburg, Worldwide Financial Crisis Largely Bypasses Canada, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/10/15/AR2008101503321.html. 
 57. Press Release, Dep’t Fin. Can., World Economic Forum Ranks Canadian Banks 
Soundest in the World for the Third Consecutive Year (Sept. 9, 2010), available at 
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Nov. 3, 2011, at B1, available at 
http://www.ctv.ca/generic/generated/static/business/article2225184.html. 
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OUTLOOK 370, 370 (2008), available at 
http://www.tgf.ca/Libraries/Publications/ABCP_Crisis_The_Canadian_Solution.sflb.ashx. 
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In 2007, $32 billion of third-party sponsored ABCP was frozen be-
cause of the inability of the issuers to rollover maturing notes.62 After 
meeting in August 2007, key market players entered what has become 
known as the “Montreal Accord.” The agreement froze the market while 
a long-term solution was developed.63 A successful restructuring of the 
markets followed, using the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act.64 
Third party releases were also included in the restructuring plan, which 
largely eliminated private litigation, though actions for fraud could still 
be pursued.65 The solution reached had implications for both public and 
private enforcement. As will be explored in both Part II and III, com-
pared to the United States, Canada saw very few securities class action 
cases related to the credit crisis. The implementation of a plan that ad-
dressed issues in both the public and private realms allowed for the 
building of a long-term plan, the avoidance of frivolous litigation, and 
for the focus to be placed on the recovery of the financial markets, rather 
than individual claims. 
II. PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT 
Public enforcement in the Canadian securities markets is the primary 
responsibility of provincial regulators, with the federal government’s 
involvement limited to investigating and prosecuting criminal offenses. 
This disjointed approach to securities regulation in Canada offers a stark 
contrast to the United States, which nationally administers securities 
regulation through the SEC. Unlike the United States, which has pursued 
numerous, highly publicized securities enforcement cases, Canadian 
regulators are frequently criticized for being too passive in their en-
forcement activities.66 However, this Article contends that public en-
forcement in Canada is robust and provides effective protection for par-
ticipants in Canadian capital markets even though its capacity is limited 
by the fragmentation and duplication of enforcement resources across 
thirteen independent securities regulators. 
                                                                                                         
 62. John Chant, The ABCP Crisis in Canada: The Implications for the Regulation of 
Financial Markets, EXPERT PANEL ON SEC. REG. 18–24, 
http://www.expertpanel.ca/documents/research-
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visited Apr. 9, 2012). 
 63. Williams, supra note 61, at 371. 
 64. Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (Can.). The Act is 
structured similar to Chapter 11 in the United States. 
 65. Williams, supra note 61. 
 66. Cory & Pilkington, supra note 38, at 186–88, 201. 
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This Part examines the effectiveness of public securities regulation in 
Canada by evaluating the regulatory framework and recent enforcement 
data from the CSA, and comparing the funding for securities enforce-
ment in Canada and the United States. This Part will also consider the 
OSC’s recent decision to introduce no-contest settlement funds in On-
tario and distribute public settlements to investors for their losses in the 
2007 ABCP crisis, as well as the market timing scandal in the Canadian 
mutual funds industry from 1999–2003.67 These decisions are evaluated 
to assess how they impact the balance between public and private en-
forcement in Ontario. Finally, the Part concludes with a discussion of 
Canada’s recent attempt to create a national securities regulator and iden-
tifies options following the Supreme Court’s ruling that the federal gov-
ernment lacks jurisdiction to create a national regulator without the con-
sent of the provinces. The options to be discussed given this ruling, are to 
continue with provincially regulated securities markets; to introduce a 
national regulator that focuses on systemic risk; or to encourage the pro-
vincial and federal cooperation in the development of a single securities 
regulator. 
A. The Effectiveness of Public Securities Regulation in Canada 
1. The Effectiveness of Canadian Securities Regulation 
Canadian securities regulators conventionally assume a low profile in 
their securities enforcement activities and emphasize deterrence over 
punitive sanctions. This has fostered a belief that “enforcement in Can-
ada is lax in comparison to the United States,”68 and consequently is less 
effective.69 Specifically, provincial regulators have been unwilling or 
unable to optimally exercise the quasi-criminal powers available to them, 
possibly because of institutional and financial constraints. Fines and 
other civil sanctions are used infrequently and tend to be far less than the 
damages sustained by investors.70 However, regulators have recently be-
gun exploring alternative approaches, such as no-contest settlements as 
well as regulatory fines, to provide partial compensation for losses suf-
fered by investors.71 Although these strategies will certainly assist regu-
lators in maximizing the utility of their scarce resources, more effective 
                                                                                                         
 67. Settlement Agreement, In re Sec. Act R.S.O. 1990, c.S.5, as amended & AGF 
Funds Inc., OSC PROC. (Dec.12, 2004). 
 68. MICHAEL E.J. PHELPS ET AL., DEP’T FIN. CAN., IT’S TIME 7 (Dec. 2003) [hereinaf-
ter IT’S TIME], available at http://www.wise-averties.ca/reports/WPC%20Final.pdf. 
 69. PURI, ENFORCEMENT EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 35, at 24. 
 70. Cory & Pilkington, supra note 38, at 228. 
 71. OSC Staff Notice 15-704, supra note 2. 
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cooperation between federal and provincial regulators would help reduce 
duplicative costs. Further, the continued development of private en-
forcement mechanisms would help ensure that investors are adequately 
protected and compensated for losses. 
Securities regulation in Canada is modeled on a regulatory pyramid 
that places significant resources on proactive compliance and strategi-
cally allocates resources in areas, such as enforcement, to deter improper 
conduct. A primary challenge for regulators is the large number of public 
companies per capita in Canada. Canada has almost half as many pub-
licly traded companies as the United States, but a market capitalization 
ten times smaller than the United States.72 The difficulties inherent in 
effectively monitoring and sanctioning smaller issuers perpetuate the 
tendency of securities regulators to focus on proactive regulation to the 
detriment of their public enforcement mandate. However, the effective 
use of a pyramid approach to regulate still requires the use of fines and 
other more aggressive penalties, like quasi-criminal sanctions, in order to 
provide effective deterrence.73 
Canadian securities regulators are not as aggressive as their American 
counterparts in enforcing violations against high profile individuals or 
seeking highly punitive penalties to deter to illegal conduct.74 However, 
as noted by Justice Peter de Cory and Professor Marilyn Pilkington, fo-
cusing narrowly on the number or value of penalties does not disclose 
whether the right matters are being prosecuted, nor will it identify institu-
tional barriers to effective securities enforcement.75 Under this pyramid 
approach to securities regulation, fines and other administrative sanctions 
should provide the basis for the securities commission’s enforcement 
activities. Jurisdictional barriers and the large number of public issuers in 
Canada present challenges for administrative enforcement. In their report 
to the Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, Cory 
and Pilkington found that the fines levied by the securities commissions 
were minimal and only accounted for a small portion of the investors’ 
total losses.76 
Unlike other regulatory contexts where regulators often have compara-
ble or greater resources than the parties being regulated, provincial secu-
rities commissions usually have far smaller annual budgets than the par-
                                                                                                         
 72. Nicholls, supra note 7, at 149. 
 73. PURI, ENFORCEMENT EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 35, at 9. 
 74. See, e.g., SEC Press Release, supra note 40; CBC NEWS, supra note 40. 
 75. Cory & Pilkington, supra note 38, at 188. 
 76. Id. at 228. 
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ties they regulate.77 In part to maximize the securities commissions’ lim-
ited resources, securities commissions recognized SROs to provide an 
additional layer of regulatory oversight. In Canada, the three most impor-
tant SROs are the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Can-
ada (“IIROC”),78 the Mutual Fund Dealers Association of Canada,79 and 
the Chambre de la Sécurité Financière,80 IIROC resulted from the con-
solidation of the Investment Dealers Association of Canada (“IDA”) and 
Market Regulation Services Inc., which occurred in 2008. 
Again differing from the United States, Canadian securities regulators 
and SROs conventionally insist that parties accept liability as a condition 
of settlement.81 This principle greatly increases the time, human re-
sources, and amount of money that regulators must devote to a particular 
file. Consequently, regulators resort to risk-based enforcement. In deter-
mining whether to pursue a matter, the OSC considers the degree of 
harm to the integrity of capital markets and the amount of resources re-
quired to pursue the case to a successful resolution.82 Therefore, to 
maximize the impact of their enforcement activities and provide the 
greatest deterrent effect, regulators may be inclined to pursue higher pro-
file targets to the exclusion of smaller issuers.83 
Over the past ten years, there has been a move to strengthen criminal 
and quasi-criminal legislation governing capital market offenses by in-
creasing maximum sentences and adding a list of aggravating factors 
                                                                                                         
 77. O.S.C., 2011 OSC ANNUAL REPORT 37 (2011), available at 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/static/_/AnnualReports/2011/pdf/OSC_AR2011_Full_ENG.pd
f. The Ontario Securities Commission had an operating budget of $84 million in 2011. Id. 
at 47. 
 78. See INV. INDUS. REG. ORG. OF CAN., http://www.iiroc.ca (last visited Apr. 10, 
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25 O.S.C. BULL. 8410, 8410 (2002) (Can.) [hereinafter OSC Staff Notice 11-719], avail-
able at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-
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 83. See Susan Wolburgh Jenah, Acting Chair, O.S.C., Presentation at the Council of 
Securities Regulators of the Americas (COSRA) Meeting: A Risk-Based Approach to 
Securities Regulation 9–11 (Aug. 31–Sept. 2, 2005), available at 
http://www.superfinanciera.gov.co/seminarios/RISK%20BASED%20APPROACH%20-
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under the criminal code.84 However, judges are often reluctant to pursue 
maximum sentences and, as a result, this greatly diminishes the impact of 
these reforms. The limited use of criminal and quasi-criminal sanctions 
by federal and provincial regulators is partially attributable to the overlap 
in jurisdiction and complexities of seeking a conviction through the 
courts, as opposed to a regulatory sanction imposed by an administrative 
body. Judicial proceedings tend to be more resource intensive than regu-
latory proceedings because of delays, constitutional protections, an ele-
vated burden of proof, and time spent educating judges who may not 
have capital markets expertise.85 Although criminal and quasi-criminal 
sanctions should be reserved for the most egregious cases and as a last 
resort, when a case involves criminal or quasi-criminal sanctions, the 
court should be open to imposing the maximum sentence, where appro-
priate, in order to send a clear signal that white collar crimes will be 
treated similarly to other criminal offenses.86 
The allocation of police resources also presents a major barrier to in-
vestigating capital market offenses. White collar crime has traditionally 
been a low priority for law enforcement and, given the highly technical 
and specialized nature of capital market offenses, generally perceived not 
to be career building for law enforcement officials.87 In response, the 
federal government established Integrated Market Enforcement Teams 
(“IMET”) in 2003 to investigate high-profile criminal capital markets 
offenses.88 Some issues however, still persist, such as the problem of at-
tracting and retaining expert investigators.89 
Additionally, the original mandate of IMET was to tackle “high-
profile” criminal cases, but it has been argued that this mandate does not 
necessarily align with the issues or enforcement objectives in each pro-
vincial jurisdiction.90 Thus, some recommend that either the IMET’s 
mandate be expanded or the capacity of other police forces be enhanced 
                                                                                                         
 84. See An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Capital Markets Fraud and Evidence-
Gathering), Bill C-13, 37th Parl., 3d Sess. (2004) (Can.); An Act to Amend the Criminal 
Code (Sentencing for Fraud), Bill C-52, 40th Parl., 2d Sess. (2009) (Can.). 
 85. Cory & Pilkington, supra note 38, at 228. See PURI, ENFORCEMENT 
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courts to deal with white collar capital market offenses. 
 86. See PURI, ENFORCEMENT EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 35, at 12–14. 
 87. Cory & Pilkington, supra note 38, at 228. 
 88. Backgrounder: Integrated Market Enforcement Team Program, ROYAL CAN. 
MOUNTED POLICE (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/imet-eipmf/backgrounder-
information-eng.htm. 
 89. Cory & Pilkington, supra note 38, at 204. 
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to tackle those cases that do not fit into the definition of “high-profile.”91 
In response to these difficulties, the federal government has committed to 
aggressively pursue white collar crime and has worked to integrate secu-
rities enforcement among provincial and territorial regulators.92 Moreo-
ver, criminal enforcement would be within the authority of the proposed 
national securities regulator. However, the Supreme Court’s recent deci-
sion that the federal government lacks jurisdiction to unilaterally create a 
national regulator means that the jurisdictional divide between federal 
and provincial enforcement will continue. 
2. Data on Securities Enforcement in Canada 
This section provides an overview of enforcement activities and sanc-
tions issued by Canadian securities commissions from 2006 to 2011. 
Consistent with the increased emphasis on prosecuting capital market 
offenses, the number of proceedings commenced has increased, along 
with the total value of fines and administrative penalties, and the number 
of cases concluded outside of the tribunal and the court processes.93 
However, the length of jail sentences has not significantly changed,94 
which demonstrates a continued reluctance by the courts to treat white-
collar crime as seriously as other criminal and quasi-criminal offenses. 
As previously indicated, quantitative data on securities enforcement 
provides a limited picture of the effectiveness of capital markets regula-
tion in Canada. Although useful for identifying general trends, this data 
provides limited insight into which cases are being chosen for prosecu-
tion and why. 
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The general data on enforcement cases from 2006 to 2010 is consid-
ered in Table 1: 
 
Cases Concluded Via…  
Year 
Proceedings 
Commenced 
Reciprocal 
Orders 
Total 
Cases 
Concluded 
Court  
Proceedings 
Tribunal 
Hearings 
Settlement 
Agreements 
2006 118 7 95 18 28 49 
2007 104 18 130 31 54 45 
2008 171 90 123 28 55 40 
2009 124 77 141 35 37 69 
2010 178 74 174 64 39 71 
Table 1: General Enforcement Data95 
Three observations are apparent from the data above. First, and per-
haps most noteworthy, is the demonstrated commitment to coordination 
among provinces evidenced by the number of reciprocal orders issued. In 
2008, amendments were passed by provincial legislatures to expand the 
use of reciprocal orders, which are used to prevent individuals or compa-
nies sanctioned by one jurisdiction, such as a cease trade order, from en-
gaging in the prohibited conduct in the reciprocating jurisdiction.96 The 
high number of reciprocal orders also illustrates the patchwork approach 
to securities regulation that exists among the Canadian provinces. 
Second, although the raw number of settlement agreements has in-
creased significantly in recent years, the percentage of cases concluded 
varies greatly from a high of 52% in 2006 to a low of 33% in 2008. As 
the OSC contemplates a move towards the no-contest settlement pro-
gram, it will be interesting to observe whether the number and percent-
age of actions resolved through settlement agreements increases over the 
coming years. 
Third, while the number of court proceedings is rising, the number of 
tribunal hearings has decreased by approximately 30% from 2008 to 
2010. Although the change is not drastic, it is significant and could be 
indicative of a shift in case management strategy, kind of allegations, and 
the parties targeted by the securities commissions. 
The most common types of violations have remained fairly consistent 
over the last few years. From 2008 to 2010, illegal distributions—that is, 
distributing securities without registration or a prospectus—formed the 
                                                                                                         
 95. 2008 ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 93; 2009 ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra 
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largest category of violations.97 The next most prominent category was 
misconduct by registrants,98 and illegal insider trading was consistently 
present over the years as well. 
The total fines and administrative penalties levied against market par-
ticipants from 2008 to 2010 are illustrated in Table 2. 
 
Year Total Fines and Administrative Penalties 
2008 $12,469,117 
2009 $153,673,008 
2010 $63,827,006 
Table 2: Fines and Administrative Penalties99 
Although the extremely large amount in 2009 was caused by settle-
ments related to the ABCP crisis,100 the increase between 2008 and 2010 
is significant and may indicate a change in the enforcement priorities of 
public regulators.101 
The statistics found in Table 3 below represent the number and term of 
prison sentences issued by courts in Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario, 
Quebec, and Manitoba. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                         
 97. In the Canadian Securities Administrators’ 2010 Enforcement Report, illegal 
distributions are defined as: “a sale of securities to investors that does not comply with 
securities law registration, trading and disclosure requirements.” 2010 ENFORCEMENT 
REPORT, supra note 93, at 10. 
 98. The Canadian Securities Administrators’ 2010 Enforcement Report explains that 
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 99. 2008 ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 93, at 6; 2009 ENFORCEMENT REPORT,  
supra note 93, at 6; 2010 ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 93, at 10. 
 100. The Canadian Securities Administrators’ 2009 Enforcement Report lists the insti-
tutions that paid out settlements related to the ABCP crisis: National Bank Financial Inc., 
Scotia Capital Inc., Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and CIBC World Markets 
Inc., HSBC Bank Canada, Laurentian Bank Securities Inc., Canaccord Financial Ltd., and 
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 101. Enforcement activities related to the 2007 ABCP crisis were still ongoing when 
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Year Number of Jail  
Sentences  
Minimum 
 Sentence 
Maximum  
Sentence 
2008 6  6 months 8.5 years 
2009 4  3 months 2.5 years 
2010 15  3 months 3 years 
Table 3: Jail Sentences Issued by Courts102 
Despite amendments increasing the maximum jail sentence for capital 
market offenses, courts appear hesitant to issue long sentences for securi-
ties law violations. At this point, it is difficult to determine whether the 
dramatic increase in the number of prison sentences in 2010 was either a 
statistical anomaly or the start of a trend. Moreover, the wide variation in 
the range and number of sentences each year reflects the disjointed ap-
proach to criminal and quasi-criminal enforcement in Canada. This is 
particularly pronounced given that only two of the fifteen sentences is-
sued in 2010 were from Ontario.103 As Canada’s largest capital market, it 
is surprising that Ontario did not issue more jail sentences and this gap 
may reflect the differing priorities in securities enforcement across Can-
ada. 
3. Comparison of the Canadian and American Enforcement Regimes 
Canadian and American securities regulators approach compliance and 
enforcement from different philosophical underpinnings. Canada’s pref-
erence for compliance based strategies and a provincially regulated secu-
rities environment has resulted in fewer high profile public securities 
cases in Canada. In the past ten years, various studies attempt to under-
stand how Canadian and American regimes compare with one another. 
Despite the common perception that Canadian securities enforcement is 
less robust than that of the United States, funding and staffing for en-
forcement activities appears to be comparable. Thus many of the differ-
ences apparent between the two systems may be rooted in different en-
forcement priorities. 
Statistics on enforcement activity generally provide a limited picture of 
the capacity and effectiveness of securities regulation in a particular ju-
risdiction. Every year, securities regulators are confronted with hundreds 
of potential enforcement matters, yet only have sufficient resources to 
examine and commence an investigation of a very small number of these 
                                                                                                         
 102. 2008 ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 93, at 6; 2009 ENFORCEMENT REPORT, 
supra note 93, at 6; 2010 ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 93, at 8. 
 103. 2011 OSC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 77, at 10. 
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claims.104 Consequently, there is little information available to identify 
those matters which are not being pursued by regulators or have evaded 
any type of review. In addition, the high number of small public issuers 
in Canada significantly complicates enforcement in Canada relative to 
the United States. 
Howell Jackson’s 2005 study on regulatory intensity for the Task 
Force to Modernize Securities Legislation suggested that although budg-
ets may not be the perfect proxy, “a reasonable level of regulatory staff-
ing is perhaps a necessary condition for effective enforcement in finan-
cial markets.”105 Overall, Jackson concluded that when economic defla-
tors were taken into consideration, Canada and the United States were 
very similar in enforcement intensity, and found Canada to have a more 
intense staffing budget as a percentage of GDP and market capitaliza-
tion.106 Although the gap between the number of enforcement actions in 
Canada and the United States was once significant, it has become pro-
gressively narrower in recent years.107 Jackson concludes that from a 
structural perspective, Canadian and American securities enforcement 
efforts tend to be largely similar.108 
Jackson’s conclusions challenge the traditional assumption that Ameri-
can enforcement is more intense than in Canada. However, since his 
study does not control for differences in capital market activity, it is not 
possible to evaluate whether the discrepancy in enforcement activity is 
the product of the regulatory environment or a different propensity for 
capital market offenses in the two jurisdictions.109 Given that staffing 
budgets are similar, the differences in enforcement activity could be the 
product of systemic inefficiencies or unique regulatory priorities and 
challenges. 
The primary difference between Canadian and American enforcement 
activity appears to be the differing philosophical approaches to securities 
regulation. Canadian securities regulators spent between 13% and 19% 
of their total operating budget on enforcement, whereas the SEC spent 
                                                                                                         
 104. Id. at 15. In the 2010–2011 fiscal year, the Ontario Securities Commission as-
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29% of its budget on enforcement during the same period.110 There were 
also significant staffing increases in the enforcement branches of the On-
tario and Quebec securities commissions from 1998 to 2005 without a 
corresponding increase in the number of cases brought.111 This may sug-
gest a decrease in the efficiency of Canadian securities enforcement ac-
tivity, or that the same number of cases are being pursued but are more 
complex and greater resources are being devoted to them. 
While not a perfect comparison, the SEC data for 2010 and 2011, as 
well as projections for 2012, demonstrate the gradual growth in the 
SEC’s enforcement budget. In 2010, enforcement comprised 33% of the 
SEC’s total budget, and was expected to remain between 32% and 34% 
for 2011 and 2012.112 With regard to staffing, the SEC dedicated 32% of 
its staff to enforcement in 2010. This number was expected to remain 
constant through 2011 and drop slightly to 30% through 2012.113 The up-
to-date data for budget and resource allocation for the OSC was not read-
ily available as the Ontario Securities Commission’s has changed its an-
nual reporting format since 2005. This highlights a gap in information 
disclosure; this information should be more easily available to the public. 
While these indices do not provide a precise measure of Canadian en-
forcement intensity, they do suggest that the mechanisms in place pro-
vide Canada with a relatively robust regulatory environment. However, 
quantitative data on enforcement only allows for prospective analysis—it 
is not capable of monitoring changes in the actual behavior of market 
participants to evaluate the deterrent effect of enforcement activities.114 
Although more difficult to measure, securities commissions and the CSA 
would benefit from undertaking a qualitative analysis of this nature. 
B. New Public Enforcement Strategies 
Although Canadian securities regulators are conventionally regarded as 
more reserved than their American counterparts, recent experience dem-
onstrates their clear willingness to adopt new enforcement and investor 
protection strategies. In October 2011 the Ontario Securities Commission 
released Staff Notice 15-704, which proposes to allow regulators to offer 
no-contest settlements without requiring respondents to make an admis-
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sion of liability.115 No-contest settlements will help strengthen securities 
enforcement in Ontario and will enable regulators to pursue a greater 
number of claims. However, no-contest settlements must be properly 
managed to avoid commoditizing damages and discounting the role of 
public regulators in ensuring accountability. 
As part of its enforcement activities, the OSC entered into substantial 
settlements following the ABCP crisis in 2007 and the investigation into 
market timing in Canadian mutual funds in 2005.116 The OSC is now at-
tempting to return the ABCP funds to investors to help offset their losses. 
These developments suggest a shift in the role and objectives of the OSC 
to the use of public penalties and fines to compensate investors. This 
shift demonstrates recognition of the diverse nature of Canadian public 
markets. It also provides enhanced investor protection by enabling secu-
rities regulators to provide restitution for investors on losses sustained 
from smaller issuers against whom it may not be economical or feasible 
to pursue a private remedy. However, for this strategy to be effective, 
greater clarification is required from the OSC and it must detail how, and 
under what circumstances, a public settlement will be distributed to in-
vestors. 
1. No-Contest Settlements 
On October 21, 2011 the OSC released Staff Notice 15-704 and re-
quested comments from participants in Canadian capital markets, as re-
quired under the OSC’s notice and request for comment procedure for 
rule making.117 This proposal stems from the OSC’s broader “credit for 
cooperation” program, which seeks to reward market participants who 
self-report regarding their roles in illegal activities.118 Two of the most 
noteworthy elements of Staff Notice 15-704 are (1) No-Enforcement Ac-
tion Agreements, which protect self-reporters from liability; and (2) the 
No-Contest Settlement Program that eliminates the existing requirement 
for a person or company to admit guilt before a settlement can be 
reached.119 Elimination of the long-standing requirement that parties ad-
mit liability is controversial and considered by some to represent the 
“Americanization” of Canadian securities enforcement.120 
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The primary impetus for introducing no-contest settlements is to facili-
tate the efficient resolution of public enforcement proceedings while 
striking a proper balance with concurrent private litigation. In the back-
ground to the staff notice, the OSC notes that issuers are often concerned 
about the implications of an admission of public liability for ongoing 
private liability.121 
Recognizing the controversy and potential for abuse surrounding no-
contest settlements, the current proposal from the OSC is cautious and 
tightly circumscribed. To be eligible for a no-contest settlement, Staff 
Notice 15-704 would require the participant to have fully complied with 
the OSC’s investigation.122 This may include self-reporting and remedial 
steps to address non-compliance including, where appropriate, provision 
of compensation to affected third parties. The no contest settlement must 
also be deemed to be in the public interest pursuant to Ontario Securities 
Act §127 and will only be available if the respondent has not been the 
subject of previous enforcement activities.123 
The use of no-contest settlements draws heavily on the U.S. approach 
to securities enforcement, which traditionally did not require regulators 
to obtain an admission of liability as part of a settlement agreement. 
However, the more guarded approach taken by the OSC reflects Can-
ada’s traditional preference for compliance based strategies and its con-
temporary shift to incorporate more aggressive enforcement activities.124 
The discretion to offer no-contest settlements in appropriate circum-
stances will provide regulators with a more tailored range of enforcement 
options. In a submission to the OSC on Staff Notice 15-704, two lawyers 
from a firm experienced in class actions contend that no-contest settle-
ments diminish the role of public regulators in ensuring accountability 
and providing the basic evidence of corporate wrongdoing necessary to 
predicate a private action.125 However, forcing public regulators to im-
pose a finding of liability limits regulators’ ability to develop proportion-
ate penalties tailored to the circumstances. 
Securities regulators already exercise a degree of selectivity in decid-
ing which cases to pursue.126 Settlement agreements reached with a re-
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spondent commonly negotiate the amount of the fine, terms of the 
agreement, and the manner in which the admission of liability is 
framed.127 Allowing regulators to offer no-contest settlements for less 
significant offenses represents sound regulatory policy and will enable 
regulators to conserve their limited enforcement resources. Contrary to 
the suggestion that no-contest settlements will undermine public securi-
ties enforcement, the wider range of settlement options could expand the 
number and range of cases that regulators are prepared to pursue. Given 
the finite financial resources of public regulators, it is not practical to 
seek full public vindication in every case. However, the ability to obtain 
a no-contest settlement agreement may still offer a significant deterrent 
effect as regulators can resolve a greater number of cases. 
Therefore, provided no-contest settlements are used in a tailored and 
proportionate manner to complement the existing enforcement activities, 
their introduction will provide a net benefit for investors and the Cana-
dian capital markets. 
2. Using Public Settlements to Compensate Investors 
Following an extensive investigation into market timing in Canadian 
mutual funds, the OSC entered into settlements with five Canadian mu-
tual funds, where they agreed to pay $205.6 million to their investors.128 
This public settlement agreement was deemed to be without prejudice to 
any other private right of action held by investors.129 However, the deci-
sion of public regulators to recover damages on behalf of private inves-
tors marks a major shift in the role and mindset of the public regulators, 
whose primary mandate has traditionally been one of compliance and 
deterrence.130 
One of the principal challenges for effective securities regulation is de-
termining the proper approach to assure investor protection. Public regu-
lators traditionally perceive their role as protecting the integrity of capital 
markets through deterrence and compliance initiatives. By contrast, pri-
vate investors are chiefly concerned with being compensated for their 
losses. Public regulators should also “assist investors in receiving com-
pensation for harms suffered in the capital markets.”131 In particular, se-
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curities regulators should seek restitution for investors where it is more 
efficient to do so, provided that investors are given adequate opportunity 
to participate in the enforcement process and have their positions heard. 
Such an approach may be particularly effective when pursuing claims 
against smaller issuers and where it is not economical for an individual 
or class given the statutory limits on private secondary market liability 
under section 138.1 of the Ontario Securities Act.132 However, such a 
shift may require an amendment to the Ontario Securities Act. The OSC 
has jurisdiction under the Ontario Securities Act to apply to the Ontario 
Superior Court for an order compelling respondents to make restitution 
or compensation directly to an aggrieved party, but the Commission ap-
pears to lack jurisdiction to distribute directly the proceeds of a public 
settlement to investors. 
The OSC’s decision to require parties involved in the OSC’s market 
timing settlement to compensate investors was relatively uncontrover-
sial.133 However, more significant policy concerns were raised by the 
OSC’s initiative to distribute $60 million to investors using public set-
tlement funds received following the ABCP crisis in 2007.134 As part of 
the court supervised ABCP restructuring, the Pan Canadian Investor 
Committee agreed to provide investors who had less than $1 million in-
vested in the ABCP market with a full return on their investment, in ex-
change for a full release from private liability with the exception of 
claims for fraud.135 This agreement stipulated that the OSC would “not 
make any order or award to compensate or make restitution to an ag-
grieved person or company or to pay general or punitive damages.”136 
Further, it stated that the settlement would be used in a “fair and appro-
priate” manner to be “determined in accordance with applicable laws, 
court orders, and the public interest.”137 Since the majority of retail in-
vestors received a full return on their investments, the OSC’s distribution 
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of these settlement funds will likely go to institutional investors such as 
large pension funds and other sophisticated parties. 
A second concern is whether the distribution of public settlement funds 
is commensurate with the reasonable expectations of the Canadian capi-
tal markets financial industry and the general public when the Pan-
Canadian Investors Committee for Third-Party Structured Asset-Backed 
Commercial Paper entered a settlement with the IIROC and the OSC. 
Although debate surrounding the legitimacy of the OSC’s move is be-
yond the scope of this paper, the Ontario Superior Court’s recent deci-
sion upholding the OSC’s use of the ABCP settlement funds may impact 
future negotiations on the use of a general release from private liabil-
ity.138 
If the OSC’s decision to compensate investors by using public settle-
ments is part of a broader policy shift, the OSC should develop clear 
policies to help manage the expectations of investors and define which 
settlements would be distributed to investors. Although it may be politi-
cally uncomfortable for public regulators like the OSC to justify retain-
ing multi-million dollar fines, regulators should be mindful of the posi-
tive role of private litigation in obtaining remuneration for investors. If 
the OSC is moving towards a policy of distributing settlements to inves-
tors, empirical research should be conducted to examine the capacity of 
private litigation to obtain comparable or superior settlements and effi-
ciently distribute funds back to investors. Ultimately, any shift in en-
forcement activity of the OSC should be fully articulated and applied 
consistently to safeguard the expectations of market participants and the 
public. 
3. Balancing Public Enforcement Strategies 
The OSC’s decision to distribute the ABCP settlement to investors and 
consider the use of no-contest settlements demonstrates alignment be-
tween public and private enforcement activities. Where investors are in-
capable of bringing a private action, distributing settlements to investors 
may offer a more efficient process and provide greater recognition of the 
rights of private investors in the public enforcement process. However, 
this approach must be carefully tailored so as not to create the expecta-
tion that the OSC will or should obtain compensation for private parties 
in all instances. No-contest settlements will also enhance the public en-
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forcement process by allowing regulators to fashion a more proportionate 
sanction for each particular offence. Accordingly, no-contest settlements 
represent sound regulatory policy and offer a more balanced approach to 
public enforcement that views deterrence and market discipline as end 
goals of effective securities regulation, rather than high-profile findings 
of liability. 
Both initiatives are positive developments for securities regulation in 
Ontario. Nevertheless, regulators must ensure that this expanded role for 
public enforcement does not usurp the rights of private litigants. It is im-
portant to allow private parties to manage their own claims and to have 
meaningful participation in the process.   
B. Canada’s Pursuit of a National Securities Regulator 
In Canada, securities are regulated at the provincial and territorial level 
through thirteen independent regulatory bodies, each with their own ca-
pabilities and priorities. This fragmented regulatory framework causes 
significant concern for Canadian capital markets and prompted the Wise 
Persons’ Committee’s recommendation in 2003 that Canada harmonize 
its securities legislation and enforcement activities.139 In 2004, twelve of 
the provinces and territories, Ontario the lone hold-out, introduced a 
passport system for securities regulation.140 The system attempted to 
harmonize securities legislation and policies by providing for mutual 
recognition of reporting issuers in each of the passport jurisdictions. 
Each province, however, continues to retain its own, independent en-
forcement agencies. 
Following a report of the Expert Panel on Securities Regulation in 
2009, the Government of Canada drafted legislation to create a national 
securities regulator and referred the proposed bill to the Supreme Court 
for a reference decision on its constitutionality.141 In December 2011, the 
Supreme Court unanimously held that the federal government does not 
have jurisdiction to enact the legislation in its current form under the fed-
eral trade and commerce power of the Constitution.142 Rather, securities 
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regulation is provincial jurisdiction under provincial property and civil 
rights powers.143 
1. Structure of the Proposed National Securities Regulator & Supreme 
Court’s Decision 
Under the proposed securities act, the federal government sought to es-
tablish the Canadian Securities Regulatory Authority to advance the ob-
jectives of increased accountability and stability in Canadian capital 
markets.144 Responsibility was to be divided between a regulatory divi-
sion and securities tribunal. The Regulatory Division would promote in-
creased accountability and stability in capital markets through increased 
communication with the Minister of Finance and establishment of an 
Investor Advisory Panel to represent the interests of both large and small 
investors at all stages of the regulation and enforcement process. Also, 
similar to the recent move by the OSC to distribute public settlements to 
investors, the Regulatory Division would have the capacity to provide 
restitution directly to investors. Enforcement proceedings would be car-
ried out before an expert securities tribunal. 
Under a nation-wide mandate, a national securities regulator would 
have the capacity to pool enforcement resources, coordinate enforcement 
efforts across multiple Canadian jurisdictions, and represent Canada in 
negotiations with regulators in international markets.145 Opponents of a 
national securities regulator argue that similar coordination can be, and 
is, achieved through cooperation among the provinces and territories. 
However, even a highly integrated regulatory framework creates a degree 
of duplicative costs and inefficient allocation of resources. More impor-
tantly, a lack of centralized accountability in Canadian capital markets 
still remains.146 Inevitably, thirteen separate regulators will pursue differ-
ent types of capital market offenses with different intensities and varying 
degrees of effectiveness in each jurisdiction. As the system is presently 
constituted, there is considerable inconsistency in the nature of cases that 
get pursued and the factors deemed relevant in sanctioning.147 Conse-
quently, it is very difficult to identify and prioritize issues of national 
interest. 
In ruling that the federal government lacked jurisdiction to enact the 
proposed securities act, the Supreme Court of Canada held that capital 
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markets in Canada developed at a local level and concluded that there 
was insufficient evidence to support the contention that they now operate 
at the national level.148 By focusing narrowly on the federalist division of 
powers question, the Supreme Court did not acquire as clear an under-
standing of the evolution and present state of Canadian capital markets. 
As a result, the Court did not provide a clear path forward for the future 
development of Canadian capital markets. 
The Court maintained that since specialized industries are geographi-
cally clustered within Canada, the securities markets for these industries 
will be similarly clustered along geographic lines.149 However, although 
these companies are often headquartered in particular geographic mar-
kets, they frequently distribute their securities in national and interna-
tional markets. Thus, the appropriate market for capital is at least na-
tionwide. In Canada, over two-thirds of issuers are reporting in more 
than one jurisdiction.150 Consequently, there is a high degree of ineffi-
ciency and duplication for both regulators and reporting issuers in Cana-
dian capital markets. 
2. Options Moving Forward 
Following the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Reference re Se-
curities Act,151 public securities regulation is at a crossroads. Although 
the previous discussion of public regulation in Canada demonstrated that 
the provinces and territories have a relatively robust enforcement envi-
ronment compared to the United States, the duplication and overlap in 
each of the jurisdictions greatly diminishes the ability of provincial and 
territorial regulators to develop nation-wide enforcement strategies. After 
the Supreme Court’s decision, there are three options available to securi-
ties regulators: (1) continue with provincially regulated securities mar-
kets and encourage cooperation under the passport system, (2) introduce 
a national regulator to address systemic risk factors that arise at the na-
tional level, or (3) encourage the provinces to cooperate with the federal 
government in developing a single securities regulator. 
First, although increased cooperation and integration is possible under 
the current model for securities regulation, inefficiencies and a lack of 
clear strategic direction continue to inhibit it. Under the passport system, 
Canadian securities regulators lack a unitary voice on the international 
stage. Further, it is not possible to effectively integrate securities regula-
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tion with macro-economic policies and the financial sector regulations 
made at the federal level. Thus, Canada will continue to be vulnerable to 
regulatory gaps, as evidenced in the regulation of ABCP during the 2007 
financial crisis. 
The Supreme Court indicated that a federal regulator focused on sys-
temic risk factors is a constitutionally valid option.152 However, it is not 
clear how the federal government could identify what constitutes sys-
temic risk and develop an appropriate regulatory framework without 
trenching upon provincial regulatory efforts. Would this regulator focus 
on companies with market capitalizations above a certain threshold or 
regulate particular financial instruments or products? The narrow man-
date of such a regulator could further exacerbate our patchwork regula-
tory environment wherein the federal regulator simply becomes the four-
teenth actor in Canada. 
Finally, the preferred option is for the federal government to continue 
to work towards establishing a national regulator by exploring coopera-
tive solutions such as an opt-in national regulator. For example, the prov-
inces could independently create an agency or the federal government 
could continue to build upon the foundation laid by the Canadian Securi-
ties Transition Office. Although the latter solution might be restricted to 
those provinces willing to cede jurisdiction to a centralized body, such a 
solution will provide for more effective enforcement proceedings and 
greater efficiency for all market participants. 
III. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
Unlike the United States, which instituted secondary market liability in 
the 1930s and implemented well-established class action legislation by 
the 1960s,153 Canada’s private enforcement regime is a relatively recent 
development. In the 1970s, Canadian securities laws were amended to 
incorporate a private statutory right of action for misrepresentations in an 
issuer’s prospectus. The capacity of private parties to initiate civil actions 
was further enhanced by the adoption of class action legislation in On-
tario in 1993, and later by all other provinces.154 This made it easier and 
more cost-effective for investors to bring actions against issuers and 
market intermediaries. In 2005, Canada’s private enforcement regime 
took its present form, when securities laws were amended to provide 
statutory liability for secondary market misrepresentations. The regime 
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was developed following the 1994 report of the Toronto Stock Exchange 
Committee on Corporate Disclosure (“Allen Committee”).155 The Allen 
Committee recognized that deterrence would be a primary objective, as 
well as compensation of aggrieved investors. Secondary market investors 
were thereby enabled to bring actions for non-negligent breaches of the 
issuer’s continuous disclosure obligations. 
Part III will review the literature and quantitative data on private en-
forcement in Canada and highlight three key observations. First, Cana-
dian and American securities and class action laws are based on the same 
underlying principles and policies.156 However, key differences emerge 
as a result of Canada’s jurisprudential approach to class action certifica-
tion and its cap on secondary market statutory liability. These differences 
may be responsible for the recent divergence in Canadian and American 
jurisprudence on global class actions. 
Second, even after accounting for Canada’s smaller capital markets, 
Canada has significantly fewer securities class actions than the United 
States each year. Interestingly, although initial claim values in Canada 
are significantly lower than those in the United States, median settlement 
values are similar. This statistic raises the question of what is causing 
such a convergence, but it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions. Be-
fore the factors responsible for these trends can be accurately evaluated, 
the Canadian class action environment must be allowed time to develop 
and yield more long term data. 
Finally, there is a strong interplay between public and private enforce-
ment in Canada. Both enforcement routes are often used simultaneously 
to promote stability and capacity in Canadian capital markets. The ABCP 
crisis in 2007 demonstrated the ability of public and private actors to 
work cooperatively to develop a court sanctioned restructuring and re-
lease from private liability. This enabled Canada to avoid most of the 
255 new class actions initiated in the United States following the finan-
cial crisis.157 The interplay between public and private enforcement was 
also evident when Canadian securities regulators sanctioned five mutual 
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funds for not having adequate safeguards in place to prevent market tim-
ing and the subsequent use of a private class action by investors to claim 
residual damages not captured in the public settlement.158 
A. Statutory Framework & Jurisprudence 
1. Secondary Market Liability 
Primary market statutory civil liability was incorporated into provincial 
securities legislation far earlier than secondary market statutory liability 
in Canada. As noted earlier, the United States has imposed statutory li-
ability on secondary market transactions since the 1930s, which allows 
considerable analysis of the effectiveness of the United States’ secondary 
enforcement regime.159 In particular, observers are critical of the ten-
dency for secondary market actions to result in pocket shifting from the 
corporation or its insurers to its shareholders.160 Thus, Canadian legisla-
tion and jurisprudence has the opportunity to consider the American ex-
perience in developing its own private enforcement system. 
In 2005, following decades of debate, part XXIII.1 of the Ontario Se-
curities Act was introduced to provide statutory liability for secondary 
market disclosures.161 The change modernized Canadian securities legis-
lation by providing investors with a strict liability, statutory right of ac-
tion when an issuer breaches their continuous disclosure obligations.162 
The reforms greatly simplify the secondary market liability framework, 
make secondary market liability more attainable than under the common 
law remedies of negligent misrepresentation and fraud, and provide a 
common legal issue for investors to rely upon in seeking certification in a 
class action. 
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2. Standing, the Burden of Proof, and Statutory & Common Law Actions 
Similar to the United States, Canada provides a right of action to any 
person or company who transacts in an issuer’s securities where a mis-
representation is made in a document or statement.163 The right of action 
extends from the time the misrepresentation is made until the time the 
statement is corrected.164 Misrepresentations or omissions that give rise 
to liability can occur in any document released by the responsible issuer 
or in any public oral statement released by a person with actual or osten-
sible authority to speak on behalf of the responsible issuer. Persons 
deemed to have influence by virtue of their relationship to the issuer may 
also be liable for their conduct or misrepresentations. Civil actions may 
be brought against the reporting issuer and its directors, officers, and ex-
perts for their contributions to the disclosure, as well as control persons 
and other individuals deemed to have influence in the corporation.165 
Thus, in the Canadian context, the group of potential defendants is con-
fined to persons who enter into a special relationship with the issuer 
rather than including any individual who makes a misstatement or com-
mits a manipulative act. 
To determine the appropriate burden for imposing liability for misrep-
resentation or omissions, Canadian securities legislation distinguishes 
between core and non-core documents. The distinction is based on 
whether the material is a constitutive part of the issuer’s continuous dis-
closure obligations as opposed to other, non-core compulsory filings with 
securities regulators.166 Issuers are subject to strict liability for any mis-
representations or omissions of material facts in their core documents. 
For non-core documents, the plaintiff’s burden of proof is higher and 
requires that at the time the document or statement was issued, the de-
fendant knew of the misrepresentation, deliberately avoided acquiring 
knowledge of the misrepresentation, or was guilty of gross misconduct in 
connection with the document or oral statement.167 Thus, Canada’s strict 
liability standard for core documents imposes greater liability on defen-
dants than in the United States, where plaintiffs are generally required to 
demonstrate recklessness.168 
Although the Ontario Securities Act gives plaintiffs a statutory right of 
action for misrepresentations or omissions, the common law torts of neg-
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ligent misrepresentation and fraud remain available to investors in both 
the primary and secondary markets.169 These common law remedies are 
preferable where the plaintiffs seek damages in excess of the statutory 
cap on secondary market liability or where the three-year limitation pe-
riod under the Ontario Securities Act has elapsed.170 Thus, it is common 
for plaintiffs to plead both a statutory claim under the Ontario Securities 
Act and a common law claim of negligent or fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion. 
In pleading a common law cause of action, plaintiffs are required to 
demonstrate their reliance on the misrepresentation. Following the Su-
preme Court of Canada’s decision in Queen v. Cognos,171 courts have 
vacillated on the proper approach to proving detrimental reliance in the 
context of class actions. In McCann v. CP Ships, the court refused to re-
quire every class member to show reliance in order for the claim to pro-
ceed as a class action.172 This approach was subsequently affirmed in 
Silver v. Imax,173 where the court allowed questions of reliance to be con-
sidered at trial. However, the Imax and McCann decisions were chal-
lenged in Dobbie v. Arctic Glacier Income Fund, where the Court found 
that in certain circumstances the question of individual reliance may 
overwhelm the common issue and render the negligent misrepresentation 
claim inappropriate for a class action proceeding.174 Without an appellate 
court’s decision clarifying the proper approach to detrimental reliance in 
a securities class action, this area of the law remains uncertain. 
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3. Limits on Secondary Market Statutory Liability 
The limit on secondary market statutory liability is a defining feature 
of Canada’s securities regime. In Ontario, potential damages against is-
suers are capped at the greater of $1 million or 5% of issuer’s market 
capitalization. Influential persons within the corporation or officers or 
directors of the issuer are liable up to the greater of $25,000 or 50% of 
their aggregate compensation from the issuer. Experts are liable for the 
greater of $1 million or the revenue earned from the issuer and its affili-
ates in the twelve months prior. Finally persons making oral public 
statements are liable for the greater of $25,000 or 50% of their aggregate 
compensation from the issuer.175 Given these relatively low caps, the 
prospect of a high settlement under the Ontario Securities Act’s secon-
dary market statutory liability provisions is greatly diminished unless the 
plaintiff brings suit against a large issuer or is able to successfully ad-
vance a common law claim for negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation. 
Consequently, if it is indeed the case that private enforcement dispropor-
tionately targets large issuers, public regulators might consider work to 
restore balance by examining how they might best tailor their enforce-
ment activities to fill this gap and ensure comprehensive market disci-
pline. 
4. The Class Actions Regime 
This section discusses the development of Ontario’s class action re-
gime since its inception in 1993. Compared to the United States, the Ca-
nadian class action regime places the greatest procedural hurdle before 
the action commences, rather than assessing the claim during the plead-
ings process. Consequently, Canada has taken a relatively reserved ap-
proach to securities class actions, and has yet to develop a class action 
bar as large and highly specialized as that found in the United States. 
Securities legislation provides investors with a broad right to bring 
civil actions against an issuer. However, the high cost of litigation rela-
tive to the quantum of damages often make these actions impractical for 
retail investors. The introduction of class action legislation helps to over-
come these barriers and makes securities litigation financially viable for 
a far wider class of investors.176 Thus, any discussion of the effectiveness 
of Canada’s private securities enforcement regime must also consider the 
efficacy of the class action system. 
Ontario’s 1993 Class Proceedings Act was modeled on Rule 23 of the 
United States Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the 1982 Law Reform 
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Commission of Ontario generated much of the policy used for interpret-
ing the provisions of the Class Proceedings Act. These guiding principles 
are (1) the promotion of judicial economy and efficiency, (2) enhanced 
access to private litigation, and (3) the modification and deterrence of the 
wrongdoer’s behavior.177 Some argue that these principles render Cana-
dian legislation “more liberal in facilitating class actions than its Ameri-
can counterpart,”178 and the principles may also present a challenge to 
finding an effective balance between public and private securities en-
forcement. This contention is examined in greater detail in the discussion 
of the Fischer v. IG Investment Management class action certification, 
where a class of investors sought private redress for losses accruing from 
market timing in Canadian mutual funds, following a finding of public 
liability and an order that damages be paid back to the injured inves-
tors.179 
In addition to requiring plaintiffs to obtain leave from the court to 
bring a secondary market statutory liability claim, they must also seek 
certification under the Class Proceedings Act. “The certification motion 
is intended to screen claims . . . at least in part to protect the defendant 
from being unjustifiably embroiled in complex and costly litigation.”180 
Canada and the United States have adopted similar approaches to certify 
classes by requiring individuals to have a common question of law or 
fact, and ensuring that the class action represents the preferable proce-
dure.181 A significant difference between the two regimes, however, is 
that in Canada, the class proceedings framework requires prospective 
class counsel to produce a plan and workable method for structuring the 
proceedings.182 As a result, the certification process can be highly liti-
gious and competing firms challenge each other’s capacity to effectively 
manage the action.183 Consequently, protracted contests for carriage of 
the class action can add significant delays to the early stages of the secu-
rities class action process in Canada. When carriage of the class action is 
not contested, the court will grant leave where it is satisfied the action is 
brought in good faith and there is a reasonable possibility of success.184 
Although the Court in Silver v. Imax appears to have established a low 
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standard of “more than a de minimis possibility of success at trial” for 
obtaining leave,185 the good faith requirement becomes relevant where 
sanctions are pursued by both public and private agents. 
In contrast, U.S. reforms focus on reducing “abusive litigation,” by en-
acting legislation such as the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995.186 These amendments created procedural safeguards to filter out 
frivolous and abusive litigation at the pleading process,187 rather than 
examining the substance of a claim during the certification process. 
Similarly, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ex-
tended the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s provisions from 
federal court securities fraud suits to include state court securities fraud 
suits.188 As a result, American law and jurisprudence has evolved in a 
manner conducive to large and numerous securities class actions. 
Comparison of class action legislation in Canada and the United States 
reveals that, on one hand, the legislators have adopted similar approaches 
to certification. As evident in the data on private enforcement (below), 
however, Canada has fewer securities class actions than the United 
States, even after appropriate deflators are taken into account. From a 
legislative perspective, this may be attributed to Canada’s emphasis on 
certification, which creates a barrier to entry before the class action can 
get under way and in some sense provides an incentive to litigate outside 
of Canada. In contrast, the U.S. focus on “abusive litigation” moves de-
lays into the pleadings stage,189 enabling U.S. courts to establish the class 
more expeditiously. 
Unlike the United States, which has provided for class actions and sec-
ondary market liability since the 1930s, Canada’s legislation is quite 
young. As a result, Canada has not yet developed a large and highly spe-
cialized class action bar. Historically, Canada has not culturally recog-
nized class actions as a fundamental element of Canada’s civil procedure 
regime, but that is changing. However, in recent years, Canada has expe-
rienced greater specialization and competition within the plaintiff’s class 
action bar. This maturation is particularly evident in the recent contest 
for carriage of the Sino Forest class action.190 In their motion, four appli-
cants vied for the right to lead this international class action which 
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claimed damages of $6.5 billion.191 In reaching his decision, Justice 
Perell of the Ontario Superior Court noted that all firms involved likely 
had the capacity and expertise to manage a class action of this magni-
tude.192 Eventually Justice Perell decided that the action proposed by two 
firms jointly should prevail because of the arm’s-length relationship be-
tween the representative plaintiff and the defendant, the broader class 
definition, and their cautious pleadings.193 The ability of four leading 
class action firms to contest carriage of the Sino Forest action evidences 
the growth of the Canadian class action bar and its increasing capacity to 
manage multiple large class actions simultaneously, while maintaining 
high settlement values. 
B. An Overview of the Most Recent Empirical Data on Securities Class 
Action Litigation in Canada 
Review of the empirical data on securities class action litigation high-
lights several distinct features in Canada’s private enforcement regime. 
In particular, since the introduction of secondary market statutory liabil-
ity in 2005, the number of new filings and ongoing cases has steadily 
increased.194 However, the numbers of class action settlements in Canada 
continue to be far fewer than the United States, averaging approximately 
one-fifth the number of claims per issuer from 2008–2011.195 Interest-
ingly, median settlement values in Canada tend to be roughly comparable 
to those in the United States averaging between $9 and $11 million per 
action—notwithstanding the fact that Canada’s market capitalization is 
approximately one-tenth than that of the United States.196 
Given that over 88% of the TSX and TSX-Venture’s market capitaliza-
tion is held by the 200 largest issuers and over 40% of listed companies 
there have market capitalization below $10 million,197 statutory liability 
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in the secondary market regime may impose a limit on the ability of pri-
vate enforcement to ensure comprehensive market discipline. Conse-
quently, the high median settlement values in Canadian securities litiga-
tion relative to U.S. settlements suggests that litigation has focused on 
larger issuers who have the market capitalization to pay multi-million 
dollar settlements. 
 
Year Number 
of Claims 
Filed198 
Number Secondary 
Market Statutory 
Liability Claims 
Filed199  
Total Number 
of Claims  
Outstanding200 
Number 
of Claims 
Filed in 
the U.S.201 
2008 12 8 26 245 
2009 9 6 28 218 
2010 10 8 33 241 
2011 15 9 45 232 
  Table 4: Secondary Market Liability Claims, 2008–2011 
1. 2008. 
Buoyed by a sharp increase in the number of secondary market statu-
tory liability claims, twelve new class actions were filed in 2008, repre-
senting a 240% increase from 2007. The steady growth in secondary 
market statutory liability claims and as a percentage of the total securities 
litigation in Canada demonstrates the suitability of the secondary market 
for class actions and the limited incentives for litigation in the primary 
market, when investors retain a statutory right of rescission.202 However, 
despite the increase in the number of new claims, growth in the total 
number of ongoing class actions remained relatively modest—increasing 
from twenty-two active cases at the end of 2007 to twenty-six by the end 
of 2008.203 
The United States also experienced a dramatic increase in class actions 
between 2007 and 2008, increasing from 198 to 245.204 This increase was 
largely driven by the 102 new class actions claiming damages after the 
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2007 credit crisis.205 By contrast, proactive intervention by provincial 
securities regulators and private institutions during the ABCP crisis in 
2007 enabled Canada to avoid much of this litigation. Because of the 
court-supervised restructuring of the ABCP market and release from pri-
vate liability only three class actions related to the credit crisis were filed 
in Canada.206 
2. 2009 
Following the dramatic growth in the number of securities class ac-
tions in 2008, there was a moderate decrease of nine new securities class 
actions filed in 2009.207 This cooling is likely due to the more conserva-
tive investment climate following the recession and lack of readily at-
tainable financing to support shareholder activism. Moreover, the linger-
ing effects of the credit crisis made it difficult for prospective litigants to 
effectively pursue private actions. Although the conduct leading to the 
credit crisis provided prospective litigants with many viable causes of 
action, the defendants they sought to recover from may have lacked ade-
quate resources to pay large settlements because of the effects of the cri-
sis. 
Despite the slight cooling in securities class actions in 2009, the num-
ber of new filings and ongoing actions remained above pre-recession 
levels. Moreover, median settlement values and the ratio of initial claim 
value to settlement value, or claim-to-settlement value, remained consis-
tent with previous years, which were $9.1 million and 15.3%, respec-
tively. By contrast, the United States experienced a marked decrease in 
both the number of class action filings and settlement values in 2009.208 
Although the smaller number of class action settlements in Canada limits 
the robustness of any conclusions, the steady increase in the number of 
ongoing securities class actions and constancy in claim-to-settlement 
ratios demonstrates the development of an increasingly capable class ac-
tions bar in Canada.209 These values indicate that Canadian firms are se-
lective in the cases they pursue and have the skills necessary to obtain 
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consistent outcomes, especially when compared to the wide discrepancy 
in settlement values and claim-to-settlement ratios in the United States.210 
3. 2010 
The number of securities class actions continued to increase steadily in 
2010 with ten new filings, eight of which involved secondary market 
statutory liability claims.211 Overall, the number of active securities class 
action claims increased from twenty-eight to thirty-three. This continued 
growth in the number of secondary market statutory liability filings was 
likely fostered by the relatively liberal approach to certification adopted 
by the Ontario Superior Court in Silver v Imax in 2009,212 and the grow-
ing familiarity and experience with the secondary market statutory liabil-
ity regime. 
The settlement of $28.5 million in Elliott v. NovaGold213 represented 
Canada’s largest securities class action settlement to date. However, this 
large settlement value was offset by a record low settlement of $1.3 mil-
lion in Henault v. Bear Lake Gold.214 As a result, the average annual set-
tlement value of $13.5 million was slightly higher.215 Record settlements 
in the United States, where the median settlement value was $11 million 
and the mean average was $42 million, likely contributed to the increase 
seen in Canada.216 Although settlement values in Canada were, on aver-
age, higher than in previous years, the wider range indicates that securi-
ties class actions in Canada are expanding. Law firms are becoming in-
creasingly entrepreneurial by searching for potential class actions with 
claims worth a variety of values. 
4. 2011 
In 2011, the number of securities class actions in Canada reached a re-
cord high. Fifteen new claims were brought and a total of forty-five ac-
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tive claims continued with initial claim values totaling $24.5 billion.217 
This dramatic increase was driven in part by the large number of new 
claims initiated against foreign issuers. The 450% growth in the number 
of securities class actions over the past decade highlights the rapid de-
velopment of Canada’s private enforcement regime and demonstrates a 
strong trend towards continued growth in the coming years.218 
However, there was also a significant decrease in the number of class 
action settlements in 2011, with only two cases settling, compared to five 
in 2010.219 Settlement values in these two cases continued to reflect a 
trend towards a broader range of settlement values, with Norbourg Asset 
Management settling with investors for $55 million and Redline Com-
munications Group for $3.6 million, with an average claim-to-settlement 
ratio of 17.5%.220 Given the number of ongoing high-value claims, it is 
anticipated that this broader range of settlement values will become a 
permanent fixture of Canada’s class actions environment over the com-
ing years. 
An emerging dynamic in Canadian and American securities class ac-
tions is the high number of claims against Chinese companies. This was 
most pronounced in the United States where the number of filings 
against Chinese-based issuers jumped from ten in 2010 to thirty-nine in 
2011.221 Although attention for the increase in the number of claims in 
Canada against Chinese issuers was muted by the smaller market, the 
three new Canadian claims against Sino Forest, Cathy Forest Products, 
and Zungi Haxi Corporation have garnered significant publicity in both 
Canada and the United States. These claims are raising concerns about 
the capacity of public and private regulators to secure judgments against 
these issuers.222 The OSC has responded to these concerns by initiating a 
targeted review of foreign issuers to ensure that existing disclosure re-
quirements provide investors with sufficient information.223 Further, the 
review is examining whether auditors, underwriters, and other market 
intermediaries supporting the issuer’s distribution are providing an effec-
tive check on the issuer’s regulatory compliance.224 
                                                                                                         
 217. HEYS & BERENBLUT, supra note 157, at 3. 
 218. Id. at 3. 
 219. Id. at 11–12. 
 220. Id. at 10. 
 221. Id. at 4. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Press Release, O.S.C., OSC Commences Emerging Market Issuers Regulatory 
Review (July 5, 2011), available at 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/NewsEvents_nr_20110705_osc-reg-review.htm. 
 224. Id.; see also R.S.O. 1990 c. S-5, §§ 37.3, 57. 
1010 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 37:3 
5. Observations 
The steady growth in securities class actions, in particular secondary 
market statutory liability claims, demonstrates the robust nature of Can-
ada’s private enforcement regime. High average settlement values as a 
percentage of the initial claim values supports the proposition that there 
is a strong balance between proactive public enforcement and, where 
necessary, private actions, to provide an effective mechanism for inves-
tors to recover a portion of their losses. However, the number of securi-
ties class action filings in Canada continues to be far fewer than the 
number of filings in the United States, even when accounting for defla-
tors, such as population.225 
Over the past three years, the range of settlement values in Canadian 
class actions has grown progressively wider as new record settlements 
are reached. Given the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Morri-
son v. National Australia Bank,226 it is likely that the trend in large class 
actions favoring Canadian firms will continue. Thus, it is anticipated that 
the Canadian securities class action bar will remain under pressure to 
expand in coming years to meet this growing demand. 
C. An Analysis of the Balance between Public and Private Enforcement 
As Canada’s securities regulatory regime continues to develop, the 
need for balance between public and private enforcement becomes in-
creasingly critical. Unlike LLSV theories of securities enforcement,227 
which emphasize the role of private enforcement as the most effective 
mechanism for balancing investor protection and economic growth,228 I 
see a system which balances public and private enforcement as most ef-
fective. The greatest value in such a system is that it allows public and 
private enforcement to work together to an ultimate common objec-
tive.229 It is not that either enforcement arm is inherently superior, rather 
the balance and the use of effective regulatory incentives can ensure that 
both public and private enforcement work together effectively to provide 
comprehensive investor protection and efficient capital markets.230 
Recently, Canada experienced three critical securities enforcement 
events, which have shaped the present regulatory environment and pro-
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vided a strong foundation for future reforms. First, Canada’s ABCP crisis 
in 2007 demonstrated the potential for public and private actors to coop-
erate in fashioning an appropriate remedy. However, the largely private 
nature of settlement negotiations and agreements leaves significant ques-
tions unanswered with respect to accountability and whether the agree-
ment was truly in the best interests of investors. Second, the public and 
private response to market timing in Canadian mutual funds between 
1999 and 2003 emphasized the similar, but jurisdictionally separate ob-
jectives of public and private enforcement regimes. Finally, the Abdula v. 
Canadian Solar—Certification 231 decision, recently affirmed by the On-
tario Court of Appeal, demonstrates the nature of the challenges for Ca-
nadian securities regulation, as the nation becomes increasingly involved 
in global class actions. 
The interplay between public and private enforcement raises questions 
about the proper balance between the deterrence and compensatory ob-
jectives of market regulation. Since the OSC appears to be taking a more 
proactive role in sanctioning violations and seeking compensation for 
harmed investors, regulators must be careful to ensure that public en-
forcement does not rob private litigants of their day in court. Public and 
private enforcement should not be viewed as mutually exclusive avenues 
for redress.232  
Remedies provided by the OSC should not be regarded as complete 
substitutes for private settlements. But, if investors were to receive stand-
ing to participate in proceedings before the OSC and were provided suf-
ficient compensation through a court-sanctioned restitution or compensa-
tion process, it is conceivable that their right to a private claim should be 
extinguished. This, of course, is subject to the implementation of appro-
priate legislation. 
1. Canada’s Asset Backed Commercial Paper Crisis in 2007 
The lack of class actions resulting from the Canadian credit crisis was 
primarily due to the response of private institutions, which took quick 
action to freeze the ABCP market. At the start of the 2007 financial cri-
sis, the Canadian ABCP market was composed of approximately $32 
billion in non-bank sponsored notes and $85 billion in bank sponsored 
notes.233 Prior to the crisis, regulators had adopted a hands-off approach 
to ABCP regulation. Since issuers were not required to provide a long-
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form prospectus detailing the content and assets underlying the ABCP, 
they were able to market all ABCP products as homogeneous, low-risk 
investment products. When the credit crisis arrived, investors began to 
question the quality of the assets guaranteeing these products and, as a 
result, the turnover of maturing notes ground to a halt. Prompt interven-
tion by private financial institutions prevented widespread defaults in the 
non-bank sponsored markets and ensured that the expectations of inves-
tors were protected. 
Following the market freeze, the Pan-Canadian Investor Committee 
agreed to a court approved restructuring of the ABCP market. The re-
structuring included a full release from private liability with the excep-
tion of claims for fraud and provided a full return on the investments of 
investors with less than $1 million in the ABCP market.234 As a result, 
the Canadian market avoided the dramatic increase in class actions seen 
in the United States. Therefore, comparisons of the number of class ac-
tions in the United States and Canada following the 2008 financial crisis 
may not provide a complete basis for analyzing the effectiveness of Can-
ada’s private enforcement regime. 
In sharp contrast to the Canadian experience, 255 new securities class 
actions were filed in the United States in 2008, with the credit crisis driv-
ing these numbers to a ten-year high.235 One hundred and ten of these 
cases were a direct result of the credit crisis and approximately half of 
the new filings were against defendants in the financial sector.236 The 
types of cases brought were similar to those in Canada, with approxi-
mately 25% related to accounting, over 40% related to product and op-
erational defects, and the remainder divided among company-specific 
earnings guidance, merger integration issues, customer and vendor is-
sues, and other industry-related issues.237 
The credit crisis generated an interesting dilemma for plaintiffs, since 
their losses were incredibly large, but the pockets from which they at-
tempted to recover these losses were incredibly small due to the crisis.238 
The disparity between the number of cases brought in Canada and the 
United States as a result of the credit crisis was significantly affected by 
Canada’s resolution of the ABCP issue. Thus, the balance between pub-
lic and private enforcement in Canada may have helped increase short-
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term investor confidence and provide greater certainty than would have 
been possible under a post facto, private enforcement system. 
Although issuers were released from private liability, public discipline 
was still enforced through sanctions by provincial securities regulators. 
Most notably, fines were levied against the investment firm Coventree 
Inc. and two of its executives for misrepresentations prior to the ABCP 
crisis. Also, private settlements were entered wherein seven Canadian 
banks agreed to pay $139 million in fines including $75 million from 
National Bank and $22 million from the Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce.239 Thus, the Canadian approach may favor proactive, public 
regulation as a first line of defense and private enforcement as a secon-
dary layer of protection. 
2. The Public and Private Response to Market Timing in Canadian Mu-
tual Funds 
Public and private enforcement both serve important roles in Ontario’s 
securities enforcement regime. As a public regulator, the OSC has broad 
public interest jurisdiction to impose market discipline and, where ap-
propriate, seek leave from the court to direct compensation to inves-
tors.240 A number of private civil remedies are also available to investors 
to ensure they receive adequate compensation and a right to manage their 
own claims. Since public and private enforcement work towards the 
common goal of ensuring comprehensive market discipline, their en-
forcement activities may overlap and raise issues of certainty and finality 
for the parties involved. The Ontario Court of Appeal’s recent decision in 
Fischer underscores the need for these two regimes to work coopera-
tively.241 Further, a good balance between both systems ensures more 
effective use of scarce enforcement resources.242 
In 2003, the OSC commenced an investigation into late trading and 
market timing in 105 Canadian mutual funds and ordered these funds to 
provide the OSC with an overview of the policies and procedures that 
they were using to combat market timing and late trading. Market timing 
occurs when investors take advantage of the “stale prices” of foreign se-
curities used to calculate the Net Asset Value (“NAV”) of an interna-
tional mutual fund. A fund’s NAV value is calculated daily at 4:00 pm 
EST, using the closing market values of all the fund’s holdings. Because 
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European and Asian markets close at 6:00 pm and fourteen hours prior to 
North American markets, the closing prices of these securities do not 
reflect developments in the North American market and may be under-
valued. Market timers exploit upward trends in the North American mar-
ket by recognizing that foreign equities in the fund are likely to gain 
when the market opens the next day, and as a result the NAV value of the 
fund will undervalue these foreign securities. In order to capitalize on 
this position, market timers make a short-term investment in the fund and 
then sell their investment once the foreign market appreciation is fac-
tored into the NAV and realize the arbitrage profit. Although not illegal, 
market timing reduces the profitability of the fund for long term inves-
tors and forces managers to hold large sums of money out of the market 
to pay for daily churn in the fund. 
When investigating five mutual fund companies243 the OSC maintained 
that the failure of these funds to implement adequate safeguards against 
market timing constituted a breach of the manager’s fiduciary duty to the 
fund.244 By 2005, the OSC had settled or rendered decisions against all 
five mutual funds, who agreed to pay a total $205.6 million to their in-
vestors.245 Significantly, these settlements were deemed to be “without 
prejudice” to the parties in “any civil or other proceedings which may be 
brought by any other person or agency.”246 
In 2009, a class of investors applied to certify a class action against 
these five funds for residual damages not accounted for in the OSC’s 
settlement. The motions judge refused their application, maintaining that 
a class action was not the preferable procedure since the policy objec-
tives of compensation, judicial economy, access to justice, and behavior 
modification had been satisfied by the OSC settlement.247 This decision 
was subsequently overturned by the Divisional Court, which held that 
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since investors were claiming monetary damages beyond those provided 
by the OSC, their claim could not have been fully satisfied.248 
Chief Justice Winkler of the Ontario Court of Appeals upheld the Divi-
sional Court’s ruling and found that the OSC serves a public regulatory 
function, which is distinct from the private remedial goals of the pro-
posed class action.249 Chief Justice Winkler ruled that the OSC “lacked 
the jurisdiction under its enabling provision of s. 127(1) of the Securities 
Act to decide the liability and damages issues raised in the private law 
action.”250 Consequently, decisions of the OSC are not capable of 
extinguishing a private party’s right of action. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Fischer is significant be-
cause it affirms the interrelationship between public and private en-
forcement in Canada and recognizes the purposes they serve. Although it 
is still premature to assess the full impact of this decision, the precedent 
it establishes provides greater certainty for prospective securities class 
actions where public enforcement activities have taken place. This dis-
tinction between public and private liability may ultimately expand the 
scope of compensation available to investors seeking redress for secon-
dary market statutory liability since sanctions levied by the OSC are not 
prejudicial to the investor’s private right of action and the cap on private, 
secondary market civil liability under §138.1 of the Ontario Securities 
Act. However, in order for the OSC to assume this role legitimately, the 
legislature would need to amend their enabling legislation. 
3. Global Class Actions 
In an increasingly integrated global economy, securities litigation fre-
quently spans multiple jurisdictions. This is especially pronounced in 
Canadian markets, given the high percentage of companies cross-listed 
on domestic and foreign exchanges. A major challenge for regulators and 
courts is determining the proper role of international private enforcement 
and whether an active securities litigation system encourages a more ef-
fective regulatory environment.251 Ontario courts appear willing to as-
sume jurisdiction in cross-border proceedings without requiring the ma-
jority of investors to be Canadian residents. This approach stands in stark 
contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison, where for-
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eign plaintiffs were denied jurisdiction to sue American defendants when 
the securities were purchased on foreign exchanges.252 The divergent 
jurisprudence in Canada and the United States may significantly impact 
the development of Canada’s class action system as foreign investors 
begin to regard Canada as a hospitable jurisdiction for global securities 
class actions. 
Generally, where there is a real and substantial connection between the 
individual claim and the jurisdiction in which the claim is being brought, 
a Canadian court will exercise its inherent jurisdiction to certify national 
and global class actions.253 However, two recent decisions in Ontario 
conflict on whether foreign investors who purchased their securities 
abroad should be certified as members of an Ontario class action. In 
McKenna v. Gammon Gold, the court refused to include investors who 
purchased securities outside of Canada in the class.254 In a more recent 
certification decision in Silver v. Imax, the court defined the class to in-
clude both Canadian and U.S. investors who purchased their shares on 
the TSX and NASDAQ.255 The court accepted that since Imax was an 
Ontario based company, trading on the TSX, Ontario was the appropriate 
jurisdiction, even though only 10–15% of the investors were Canadian 
residents.256 
Another example of Canadian courts’ willingness to assume jurisdic-
tion in global class actions was in Mondor v. Fisherman, where Canadian 
investors brought a class action against YBM for secondary market 
losses.257 Since YBM’s headquarters were located in Pennsylvania, a 
class action was also filed by American shareholders in the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.258 It was agreed by the 
judges in both jurisdictions, however, that Canada had a greater interest 
than the United States in the subject matter since YBM was incorporated 
in Canada.259 These cases demonstrate a general willingness by Canadian 
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courts to assume jurisdiction for international class actions where a con-
nection to Canada has been established. 
The opportunity for Canadian courts to hear global class actions may 
be accentuated by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison,260 
where Justice Scalia held that there is no cause of action for a foreign 
plaintiff to sue foreign and American defendants for misconduct in con-
nection with securities traded on foreign exchanges.261 Since the United 
States appears to be adopting a more restrictive approach to international 
class action certification, Morrison may steer litigation to the jurisdiction 
where the company is incorporated or listed. This may, in turn, force the 
Canadian class action bar to develop increased autonomy and capacity. 
Another indication of the willingness of Canadian courts to assume ju-
risdiction in international class actions was seen in the certification deci-
sion in Abdula v. Canadian Solar.262 In approving the certification, the 
Ontario Superior Court held that Canada had jurisdiction because Cana-
dian Solar is a company incorporated in Canada who sold securities to 
Canadian investors, notwithstanding that Canadian Solar’s principal 
place of business is China, their securities are listed exclusively on the 
NASDAQ, and all regulatory filings and disclosures were made to the 
SEC.263 In his decision, Justice Taylor relied heavily upon the Ontario 
Superior Court’s decision in Silver v. Imax to support his liberal ap-
proach to certifying this action.264 Since Canadian Solar’s sole links to 
Canada’s jurisdiction are its place of incorporation and investors, this 
decision appears to push the limits of the precedent from Imax and Mon-
dor. Thus, the Ontario Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Canadian 
Solar is very important to the evolution of Canada’s global class action 
regime. The Court of Appeal’s affirmation of Justice Taylor’s decision, 
clearly signals Canada’s willingness to allow actions against foreign is-
suers if a real and substantial connection to Canada is established, and 
may cause plaintiffs to regard Canada as a viable alternative to the 
United States following its decision in Morrison. 
4. Private Enforcement Conclusions 
The introduction of secondary market statutory liability and class ac-
tion legislation created an opportunity for investors to pursue far more 
claims than would have been possible under the common law. Still, secu-
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rities class action litigation in Canada occurs far less frequently than in 
the United States. This appears to be the result of multiple factors. First, 
Canadian capital markets are approximately one-tenth the size of Ameri-
can markets. Second, secondary market statutory liability has been part 
of the U.S. securities landscape for over eighty years, whereas it has ex-
isted in Canada for only seven years and is still developing sufficient 
jurisprudence to guide its implementation. Also, elements of the Cana-
dian regime may limit the number of cases pursued under the secondary 
market civil liability provision. The limits on statutory liability and the 
double leave requirement for certifying a secondary market statutory li-
ability class action serve as procedural gatekeepers for private enforce-
ment. Consequently, the frequency and range of defendants appearing in 
private securities actions appears to be limited. 265 
CONCLUSION 
Securities enforcement in Canada has significant room for further de-
velopment and harmonization between the public and private enforce-
ment regimes. Overall, the future of securities regulation in Canada de-
pends on the ability of legislators, courts, and regulators to strike an ap-
propriate balance between public and private mechanisms. Despite the 
suggestion that investors should be allowed to seek redress through the 
civil liability system, a robust public regulatory system is essential for 
deterrence and compensation. 
Review of Canada’s public enforcement regime suggests that Canadian 
regulators are traditionally more reserved than their American counter-
parts. This difference appears to be due to the differing philosophical 
approaches to enforcement. Similarly, private enforcement in Canada 
also appears to be less active than in the United States. As a result, any 
reforms aimed at improving securities enforcement in Canada must not 
proceed with a view that one enforcement regime is dominant in Canada. 
Strengthening the capacity of one regime without due regard for the 
other may significantly limit the ability of the overall securities regime to 
achieve optimal deterrence and compensation. 
Recent initiatives by the OSC to return the proceeds of public settle-
ments to investors and the courts’ willingness to grant broad standing to 
global securities class actions may demonstrate an effort to align the in-
terests and objectives of public and private enforcement. Overall, these 
appear to be positive developments, and so long as they are properly 
managed, they will complement the recent growth in private enforcement 
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since the introduction of secondary market statutory liability in 2005. 
The number of private securities class actions has been increasing stead-
ily and damages have remained comparatively high as a percentage of 
initial claim value. This demonstrates the strength of the plaintiff’s bar in 
Canada. However, the number of claims filed in Canada continues to be 
far fewer than the United States (even after accounting for appropriate 
deflators), indicating that there continues to be significant room for fur-
ther development. 
Further development is also necessary for public and private enforce-
ment regimes in Canada. The number of private actions initiated by in-
vestors continues to be far lower than the United States. Given the statu-
tory cap on secondary market statutory damages, we must question 
whether private enforcement is capable of providing market discipline 
against smaller issuers. After the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent ref-
erence decision on the constitutionality of a national securities regulator, 
public enforcement will continue to be challenged by a lack of coordi-
nated, centralized enforcement and duplication of resources in each of 
the provinces and territories. 
 
